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Abstract—This work presents a novel approach for integrity
monitoring of AIS data. Currently, the AIS is a valuable source
for maritime traffic situation assessment but not suited for
collision avoidance, as it is prone to failures and not capable
of indicating the level of data integrity. To tackle this, an
EKF was designed to track vessel trajectories, which allows for
failure detection based on residual monitoring. For the latter, two
methods for hypotheses testing were implemented, namely chi-
squared and GLR tests. In addition, the IMM framework was
adopted for mixing the state estimates of two different process
models, the CV and CTRV. The designed filter will be validated
on behalf of simulated and real-world AIS data.
Index Terms—AIS, EKF, IMM, trajectory tracking, integrity
monitoring, collision avoidance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades the maritime world was subject
to an ever increasing number of traffic participants follow-
ing the overall growth in seaborne trade (see [1] and [2]).
Consequently, the vessels that carry the goods, e.g., bulk
carriers, container ships, and others, do not only grow in
pure numbers but also in size and tonnage. Considering that
according to [3] roughly 80 % of the global trade is seaborne,
strict safety demands need to be deployed to protect not only
humans and environment but also vital economic interests. To
reduce the increased risk of collisions at sea due to dense
traffic and limited manoeuvrability the IMO introduced the
Automatic Identification System (AIS) in 2004 for vessels
greater than 300 GRT. Equipped with an AIS transceiver a
vessel will not only broadcast its own Position, Navigation
and Time (PNT) data but also receive information of others
in her vicinity. Shore-based VTS stations deploy AIS to
enhance their possibilities of maritime surveillance. However,
although the implementation of AIS has already depleted the
collisions at sea, the system itself is still subject to several
limitations. Long-term analyses in [4] of real-world AIS data
show, that many AIS messages contain either implausible
position coordinates, single parameters being set to default
values, or that succeeding AIS data frames heavily violate
the specified update rate. Additionally, AIS parameters such
as course over ground (COG) or speed over ground (SOG)
may be derived from faulty position estimates constituting to
a false picture of the dynamic state of the vessel. Typically,
parameters such as accuracy, integrity, continuity, and avail-
ability are used to quantify the performance of a navigation
system. The AIS, however, was originally designed as radio
broadcast channel for exchange of static and navigation data
only. Thus, it does not provide any integrity information, nor
does it ensure continuity of the service. For that reason, AIS
can be currently understood as a supportive but not reliable
system for maritime traffic situation assessment. In fact, the
sole use of AIS for collision avoidance is illegal with respect
to [5]. To compensate for the addressed drawbacks of the
AIS it is proposed to perform trajectory tracking and integrity
monitoring of AIS data. In this context, integrity is understood
as plain measure if the current AIS data can be trusted or not.
While existing methods for AIS integrity monitoring in [4]
work fairly well for vessels proceeding along a straight path,
they suffer from false alarms in non-linear situations (e.g. a
turn manoeuvre). For that reason, this work presents a novel
approach for AIS integrity monitoring and trajectory tracking
based on the design of an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF).
Two motion models will be introduced, that are expected to
represent the vessels dynamics either in nearly straight line
motion or turn manoeuvres, respectively. To merge the benefits
of both models in one filter, the Interacting Multiple Model
(IMM) framework of [6] was adopted, which showed good
performance for vessel tracking in [7] and [8]. By monitoring
the innovation of the filter, hypotheses tests can be applied
to detect abnormal system behaviour. Common approaches
involving the chi-squared or Generalized Likelihood Ratio
(GLR) test can be found in many failure detection schemes
for dynamic systems, e.g. for GNSS based applications (see
[9], [10] and [11]).
The remainder of this document is structured as follows.
In Section II the AIS data sources relevant to this work are
introduced. The design of the filter will be presented in Section
III, deriving also means for failure detection. The proposed
algorithm will be validated in Section IV with respect to
simulated and real-world data. The conclusion to this work
is given in Section V.
II. AIS DATA SOURCES
The typical AIS data set contains numerous static and
dynamic parameters, that are distributed over different AIS
Table I: Dynamic parameters contained in AIS message types.
parameter
AIS msg
type 1-3 8 18 comment
Longitude × × × resolution:
min/10000 (1-3, 18), min/100 (8)
Latitude × × × same as above
COG × × × resolution:
0.1 deg (1-3, 18), 1 deg (8)
SOG × × × resolution: 0.1 knots (1-3, 18), 0.5 m/s
(8)
ROT × ROTAIS = [4.733√ROTSensor],
ROTAIS ∈ [−27, . . . , 27 − 1],
ROTSensor[deg min−1]
True Head-
ing
× × resolution: 1 deg
message types and specified in the International Telecommu-
nication Union (ITU)-R recommendation [12]. Table I lists the
dynamic parameters transmitted in AIS message IDs 1-3, 81
and 182. An additional challenge to tracking AIS trajectories
is the rather slow and non-constant update rate of the mes-
sages listed in Table I. The specified time intervals between
successive messages range from 2 s to 180 s, depending on the
dynamic state of the vessel [12]. As was shown in [4] these
reporting rates are violated in a considerable amount of cases,
where the transmission or reception of single or successive
messages is failing.
It has to be noted that the true heading and rate of turn
(ROT) parameters are typically derived from a gyro compass,
whereas the position coordinates and subsequent parameters
like SOG and COG depend on the output of an attached
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver. To stay
consistent with the range of possible AIS position reports the
longitude, latitude coordinates as well as the SOG and COG
were identified as a minimum set of parameters to describe the
trajectory of a vessel. Under this premise, the vessel dynamics
is modelled by two different process models that will be
defined in Section III.
A. AIS measurement data
Despite a massive volume of recorded real-world AIS data
available at DLR a dedicated maritime measurement campaign
was conducted in October 2015 for validating the designed
filter. An offshore supply vessel3 was conducting manoeuvres
similar to sea trials for two successive days in the Baltic Sea
(see Fig. 1). The transmitted AIS messages of the measurement
1AIS message ID 8 is a broadcast message with unspecified binary payload.
The subtype with indicators DAC = 001 and FID = 21 contains a weather
observation report and vessel parameters.
2AIS Class B transceivers issue a reduced position report.
3The BALTIC TAUCHER II was used, see http://www.marinetraffic.com/
en/photos/of/ships/shipid:134683/#forward
vessel were recorded at a shore-based AIS station at the
Darßer Ort Lighthouse, Germany4. In order to obtain a pseudo
reference trajectory the ship was equipped with a PNT unit,
that is capable of providing highly accurate position data on
behalf of sensor fusion (i.e., fusion of GNSS, inertial and other
onboard sensors) [13]. For this work, the reference position
data was obtained from a Precise Point Positioning (PPP)
solution using GPS and GLONASS observations. From this
assumed ground truth of position values the associated COG
and SOG of the measurement vessel were computed for later
reference. For the validation of the proposed filter in Section
Figure 1: Nautical chart depicting the area of the measurement
campaign at the Baltic Sea, zooming into the selected test
trajectory. The bottom right picture shows the measurement
vessel.
IV, only parts of the second day will be evaluated. Originally,
a total of 15.43 h with reference and AIS data being recorded
in parallel was available for that day. From this sequence, the
subset highlighted in Fig. 1 was selected, covering 4.35 h or
2001 valid AIS messages, respectively.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The purpose of this work is the design of a filter that
is providing continuous and plausibility-proved position data
of a vessel’s trajectory. Both goals can be accomplished by
applying a recursive Bayesian estimator to the input AIS data.
In Bayes’ theorem the posterior probability of a system to be
in the estimated state is based on a given prior probability and
the conditioning on actual measurements [14]. A powerful im-
plementation of the Bayesian framework is the Kalman Filter
(KF) [15], which consists of an iterative prediction-correction
process. The classical approach to derive integrity information
based on Kalman filtering incorporates the monitoring of the
residual, i.e., the innovation of the filter. In case the system
dynamics can be modelled as a linear process and the Gauss-
Markov assumption holds, the KF also provides the optimal
4Courtesy of German Federal Waterways and Shipping Administration
(WSV)
state estimation (in terms of the minimized mean-squared
error (MMSE) criterion, see [16]). The state of the system
at time instance k is captured in a vector xk, with N state
elements. Assuming a linear system model, the process model
to propagate the state vector xk−1 to the next time frame can
be formulated as
xk|k−1 = Akxk−1 + Bkuk + q,k (1)
and the measurement model as
zk|k−1 = Hkxk|k−1 + r,k, (2)
with uk ∈ RL×1 being the control input to the system,
zk|k−1 ∈ RM×1 the measurement at time instance k, with
respect to the previous state at k − 1. The additive noise
in the process and measurement domain is modelled by
q,k ∼ N (0,Σ= Qk) and r,k ∼ N (0,Σ= Rk), respectively.
The square matrix Ak of rank N denotes the state transition
from k − 1 to k, whereas Bk ∈ RN×L maps the control
vector to the state space. In the correction step, Hk ∈ RM×N
transforms the predicted state xk|k−1 to the measurement
domain. In sequential Bayesian filtering the current system
state is estimated on behalf of its probability distribution
function (pdf), which is generally unknown. Thus, a KF not
only estimates the mean of the state, but also its associated
covariance Pk, a square matrix of rank N . In the prediction
step Pk−1 is propagated to
Pk|k−1 = AkPk−1ATk + Qk, (3)
while the correction yields
Pk = (IN×N −KkHk)Pk|k−1. (4)
In this context, the Kalman Gain Kk ∈ RN×M is introduced,
steering the impact of the measurement on the state correction.
It is computed from
Kk = Pk|k−1HTk S
−1
k , (5)
being dependent on Sk ∈ RM×M , which is defined as
Sk = HkPk|k−1HTk + Rk. (6)
The actual correction of the state is obtained from
xk = xk|k−1 + Kkyk, (7)
with yk ∈ RM×1 denoting the residual between expected and
actual measurement
yk = zk −Hkxk|k−1. (8)
A. Filter design
In the maritime domain, and many other real-world prob-
lems, the very essential requirement for a KF of having a linear
model of the system dynamics is not fulfilled. A common
approach to tackle this is the linearisation of the model around
the current state estimate leading to the Extended Kalman
Filter (EKF). In the following, two models for vessel motion
at sea will be introduced, that constitute to an EKF-based
estimation framework.
1) Constant Velocity process model: Frequently used to
describe the dynamics of vessels at sea is the Constant Velocity
(CV) model, e.g. in [7] or [8]. In this work, the state of the
vessel for the CV at time instance k is defined as follows:
xk = [px,k, py,k, ψk, vk]
T (9)
with px,k and py,k as position estimates in the Cartesian plane,
ψk as course over ground (COG) and vk as speed over ground
(SOG). The time discrete motion model is defined as follows
px,k = px,k−1 + ∆tvx,k (10)
py,k = py,k−1 + ∆tvy,k (11)
ψk = ψk−1 + ∆tψ,k (12)
vk = vk−1 + ∆tv,k. (13)
Since only the absolute value for vk is known, the velocity
components in x and y direction from (10) and (11) are defined
as
vx,k = vk sinψk (14)
and
vy,k = vk cosψk, (15)
respectively. Equations (14) and (15) couple the tracked state
parameters vk (SOG) and ψk (COG) with the position esti-
mates. At time instance k, however, the best estimates for ψk
and vk are defined in (12) and (13). This leads eventually to
px,k = px,k−1 + ∆t[(vk−1 + ∆tv,k)
sin (ψk−1 + ∆tψ,k)]
(16)
and
py,k = py,k−1 + ∆t[(vk−1 + ∆tv,k)
cos (ψk−1 + ∆tψ,k)].
(17)
2) Constant Turn Rate Velocity process model: In general,
the Constant Turn Rate Velocity (CTRV) can be seen as an
extension of the CV. At time instance k the system state in
the CTRV is defined as
xk = [px,k, py,k, ψk, vk, ωk]
T (18)
with the turn rate ωk as additional parameter. The expression
in (12) is modified to
ψk = ψk−1 + ∆t(ωk−1 + ∆tω,k), (19)
with
ωk = ωk−1 + ∆tω,k, (20)
applying a constant velocity and turn rate model for vk and
ωk. Following the argumentation from the CV process model,
the position estimates for the CTRV model are now expressed
as
px,k = px,k−1 + ∆t[(vk−1 + ∆tv,k) . . .
sin (ψk−1 + ∆t (ωk−1 + ∆tω,k))]
(21)
and
py,k = py,k−1 + ∆t[(vk−1 + ∆tv,k) . . .
cos (ψk−1 + ∆t (ωk−1 + ∆tω,k))],
(22)
keeping in mind that ψk is also coupled with ωk.
It has to be noted that in both process models no control
input uk was defined. This is motivated by the fact, that AIS
parameters that could be understood as driving force to the
system, such as ROT, SOG or COG are simply insufficient in
terms of consistency.
In both cases, CV and CTRV, the system state is modelled
as a non-linear process, violating a key requirement of the KF.
As was mentioned before, the EKF is one of the solutions
to overcome this challenge (e.g., see [17]). In the EKF the
process and measurement model from (1) and (2) are altered
to the generalized form of
xk|k−1 = f(xk−1, q,k) (23)
zk|k−1 = h(xk|k−1) + r,k, (24)
where f(·) and h(·) are no more matrices, but non-linear,
multi-variate functions modelling the system in the state and
measurement domain, respectively. Note, that f(·) takes in
general uk as input argument, which is omitted in this specific
case of no driving force to the system. The linearisation around
the current system state is achieved by the first order Taylor
series expansion, assuming that the higher order terms are
negligible. The propagation of the error state covariance Pk−1
from (3) is then altered to
Pk|k−1 = FkPk−1FTk + CkQkC
T
k (25)
and the correction of Pk|k−1 from (4) to
Pk = (IN×N −KkHk) Pk|k−1. (26)
The matrices Fk, Ck and Hk are the Jacobians of f(·) and
h(·) with
Fk =
∂f
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=xk−1
, (27)
Ck =
∂f
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=q,k
, (28)
Hk =
∂h
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=xk|k−1
. (29)
Equations (5) and (6) remain untouched, although Hk does
not represent the state transition matrix to the measurement
domain any more, but instead the Jacobian from (29).
3) Measurement model: In case of AIS measurements it can
not be guaranteed that the measurements of COG and SOG are
truly independent, as they might be derived from the position
estimate. In this case the cross-correlation of these sensors
needs to be reflected in the non-diagonal elements of R, which
is out of the scope of this work. The true heading, however,
is obtained from a gyro compass, i.e., from an independent
sensor source. But again, this parameter could not only deviate
from the COG, due to sea currents or wind, some recordings
have also shown corrupted true heading data. Due to these
considerations, the measurement model is defined as
h(xk|k−1) =
px,k|k−1py,k|k−1 . (30)
B. IMM framework for model mixing
Both process models, CV and CTRV, were introduced in
the preceding paragraphs as they are expected to outperform
each other in different scenarios of vessel movement. While
the CV model should fit a (nearly) straight line motion best, the
CTRV is assumed to be beneficial in turn manoeuvres due to
the tracking of the turn rate. Although it might be tolerable to
use only one model for all dynamic scenarios, it is much more
appealing to merge the benefits of both in one combined filter.
A computationally efficient way to do so can be found in the
IMM framework, that was first introduced in [6] and proposed
for vessel tracking in [8]. In contrast to other schemes that
exploit the idea of multiple models running in parallel, the
IMM mixes the state estimates of different models instead
of yielding a hard decision between one or the other. The
transition between different models (or modes) is governed by
an underlying Markov process. The key concept of the IMM
can be summarized in four steps:
1) Prior to each prediction-correction cycle of D KFs, the
mixed initial conditions for the D state estimates x0ik−1
and their associated covariances P0ik−1 are computed.
This is based on the model probabilities pik−1, the mix-
ing probabilities pi|jk−1 and the state transition probability
Tij , with i, j ∈ [1, . . . , D].
2) Each of the D pairs x0ik−1, P
0i
k−1 is fed to a KF, which
yields xik, P
i
k after a completed iteration.
3) The mode probabilities pik will be updated, evaluating
the likelihood Ωik of the model to fit the current system
dynamics. The update of Ωik itself is based on the
innovation measure of the corresponding KF.
4) The filter output at time instance k are the weighted
sums of all state estimates xik and their associated
covariances Pik.
The reader is referred to [6] for a detailed derivation. Special
care has to be taken in the mixing stage of the IMM, in case
state spaces of different dimensions are involved, which is
without theoretical support from the original IMM framework.
To account for this, the state vectors and error state covariances
are typically augmented with zeros in places of missing
elements, which will, in consequence, lead to biased mixed
state estimates. In this work, an approach introduced in [18]
was adopted that relies on the mutual knowledge of common
and additional state elements between models of different
dimensions. Prior to each mixing stage, the state estimates
and their associated covariances will be adopted to obtain an
unbiased state estimate of the IMM filter.
C. Failure detection by residual monitoring
Besides vessel trajectory tracking, this work aims at provid-
ing a measure of the AIS data integrity. For that purpose two
standard hypotheses tests were implemented, that exploit the
KF property of a uniform, zero-mean, Gaussian distribution
of the innovation yk (with covariance Sk). In fact, this
assumption holds true for non-corrupted measurement data
assuming the KF was designed correctly.
1) Chi-Squared test: In this case, the normalized and
squared residual from (31) should follow a centralized chi-
squared distribution with M Degrees of Freedom (DoF) (with
measurement state z ∈ RM×1).
‖y˜k‖2 = yTk S−1k yk (31)
Applying the p-value constraint, an implausible AIS message
would be detected if Equation (32) applies, with p = 1 − α.
This means, that the hypothesis H0 (‖y˜k‖2 belongs to the
expected chi-squared distribution) can be rejected with prob-
ability of p.
‖y˜k‖2 > χ2α (32)
A typical choice of α would be 0.05, yielding a 95% certainty
to either reject or accept H0. The value χ2α for a specific α and
M DoF can be taken from look-up tables. In order to decrease
the sensitivity of the depicted approach to single outliers and
in consequence the False Alarm Rate (FAR) of the system, the
test is conducted for an average of Nχ2 successive innovation
samples. Following the proposed method in [10], this yields a
test statistic l(k), with
l(k) =
k∑
i=k−Nχ2+1
yTi S
−1
i yi. (33)
The constraint for issuing a failure alert from (32) is merely
altered to
l(k) > χ2α, (34)
testing l(k) against a chi-squared distribution of Nχ2M DoF
(in contrast to M DoF in the previous case). Naturally, the
choice of Nχ2 , i.e., the windowing length, always results in a
trade-off between a low FAR and undetected system failures.
In summary, the chi-squared hypothesis test offers a simple to
implement, yet limited failure detection scheme [10].
2) Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test: Compared to the chi-
squared method, the GLR test offers a more subtle technique
to detect failures in a system by monitoring the innovation
measure of a KF. In principle, the GLR is based on a common
log likelihood estimator to test H1 against H0 under the
presence of a measurement fault at time θ, with H0 : yk ∼
N (0,Sk) and H1 : yk ∼ N (µ,Sk). In the context of the
GLR, a system failure is mainly characterized by the change
magnitude ν ∈ RN×1, which is typically unknown prior to
the failure. The test statistic of the log likelihood estimator is
then constituted from
lk(θ) = ln
(
p(yk|θ,ν)
p(yk|H0)
)
. (35)
Essentially, the GLR modifies this estimator by replacing
the unknown dependencies ν and θ with their Maximum
Likelihood Estimates (MLE) νˆ and θˆ. This is accomplished
by a double maximization of lk(θ) over ν and θ, following
νˆ(θ) = argmax
ν
ln
(
p(yk|θ,ν)
p(yk|H0)
)
(36)
and
θˆ = argmax
θ
ln
(
p(yk|θ, νˆ(θ))
p(yk|H0)
)
. (37)
Now, assuming a valid detection threshold h a jump candidate
θˆ is accepted, if the condition
lk(θˆ, νˆ(θˆ)) > h (38)
is true. Still, this abstraction does not yield a methodology
applicable for online detection of system failures, since the
entire sample history is required to establish the test statistic
in (38). For that reason a recursive formulation of the GLR
was derived in [9], that allows to update the test statistic lk(θ)
only with respect to the latest estimate of νk(θ). The key
idea is to model the impact of any fault in the measurements
as linear regression to the corrected state estimate and to the
innovation of the filter. This yields the linear regressors φTz,k
and µz,k, with the subscript z denoting that only faults in
the measurement domain are considered. These regressors are
propagated to the next time frame k + 1 by
φTz,k+1(θ) = Γz(k, θ)−HkFkµz,k(θ) (39)
µz,k+1(θ) = Fkµz,k(θ) + Kk+1φ
T
z,k+1(θ), (40)
introducing a link to the EKF framework. The state transition
matrix Fk is the Jacobian from Equation (27), Kk+1 is the
Kalman Gain from Equation (5) and Hk the state transition to
the measurement domain from Equation (29). Note, that the
subscripts of k and k + 1 are used in a slightly misleading
manner. Here, they annotate the difference between prediction
and correction step, which shall be only an exception to the
previous notation in this work. The function Γz(·) in (39),
however, allows us to model any expected type of fault in the
observed system. For instance, a sudden jump at time θ in the
measurement data would simply be represented as
Γz(k, θ) = δ(k − θ), (41)
with δ(·) being the Kronecker-Delta. Following [9] and [11]
the online fault detection is then obtained from a recursive
least-squares framework, that yields the MLE for νˆk(θ) to be
expressed as
νˆk(θ) = νˆk−1(θ) + Lk(yk − φTk νˆk−1(θ)), (42)
with the gain Lk and the covariance of the change magnitude
Pνk given by
Lk = P
ν
k−1φk
[
φTkP
ν
k−1φk + Sk
]−1
(43)
and
Pνk = P
ν
k−1 − LkφTkPνk−1. (44)
By introducing the compact quantity
fk(θ) =
k∑
i=1
φi(θ)S
−1
i yi, (45)
the test statistic lk(θ, νˆ(θ)) can be expressed in a more
convenient way as
lk(θ, νˆ(θ)) = f
T
k (θ)νˆk(θ). (46)
Finally, the MLE for θˆ is obtained from the value that
maximizes lk(θˆ, νˆ(θ)).
So far, the implementation of the depicted scheme would still
yield a growing complexity during online detection with an
increasing number of samples to consider. However, with the
recursive framework for estimating νˆ and θˆ at hand, the GLR
test can be restricted to a data window of finite width NGLR
(see [9]). This means, at any time k the failure detection
scheme will be utilized over the past NGLR − 1 filter states.
3) Failure detection in IMM filter: While the implemen-
tation of the introduced failure detection schemes is rather
straight-forward for a stand-alone EKF some adaptions are
required for the IMM filter. Due to the mixing of multiple
models with different state spaces it is not possible to imple-
ment one GLR test for the combined state estimate. Instead
of this, each model requires its own GLR test, that is based
on the NGLR latest model specific Jacobians and Kalman
Gains. The final decision rule is simply modified to switch
between the different GLR test outputs, depending on the
IMM model probability. In contrast to that, only one chi-
squared test is conducted for the IMM, since the required test
statistic lχ2(k) is constructed from the residuals only. Indeed,
as the measurement domain is of the same dimensionality for
both models, lχ2(k) is built up from the past Nχ2 squared
and normalized residuals from the model with the highest
probability at those times.
D. Accounting for non-continuous measurements
To tie the integrity measure solely to the innovation mon-
itoring related to the correction step involves the risk of
underestimating the growing uncertainty of state prediction in
case of missing AIS messages. The violation of the specified
update rate, may it be unintentional or on purpose, occurs far
more often than expected, as was shown in [4]. In these cases
the error covariance Pk|k−1 will constantly be growing, since
one or more correction steps are missing in between multiple
prediction cycles.
To account for this phenomenon in the integrity assessment
the following method is proposed:
• Error bounds exx and eyy shall be defined for the diagonal
elements of the error covariance Pk|k−1 that correspond
to the variances of the position estimates, i.e., σ2p,xx and
σ2p,yy.
• If σ2p,xx > e
2
xx or σ
2
p,yy > e
2
yy an error flag will be raised.
• This approach yields a binary decision rule (alert — no
alert)
In order to link these error bounds to physical constraints the
matter of ship domains was investigated. Various researchers
have made an attempt to define safety regions of vessels, based
on empirical studies or surveying experienced mariners (see
[19]). In the first publication addressing this issue (Fuji, in
1971, [20]) the well-known safety distance of 4L in bow-
stern axis and 1.6L abeam was defined, with L being the
length overall (LOA) of the current vessel. In fact, it turns out
that these ship domains are commonly accepted and put to
practice, as data analysis shows. For this reason, the estimated
variances of the position coordinates are bounded by the Fuji
constraints, that is exx = 4L and eyy = 1.6L in y-direction of
the body frame. Note, that this approach also implies different
alert levels for different-sized vessels, assuming they shared
the same AIS update rate and same amount of missing AIS
messages. The final integrity measure at time instance k is
a binary indicator constituted as disjunction of AFA,k and
ABA,k
Ak = AFA,k ∪ABA,k, (47)
where AFA,k is the measurement failure alert based on in-
novation monitoring and ABA,k the alert for violated safety
bounds based on monitoring the error state covariance.
E. Algorithm
AIS message
at time k
multi-step ahead prediction:
• propagate state xik−1 to
xi
k|k−1 and its covariance
Pik−1 to P
i
k|k−1 for each
model i ∈ {CV,CTRV}
• check if Pi
k|k−1 is still
bounded by ship domain; if
not, issue integrity alert in
ABA,k
• repeat with ∆t = 1 s until
new measurement arrives
correction:
• update residual covariance
Sik and Kalman Gain K
i
k
• update state estimate xik and
its covariance Pik for each
model i
• compute IMM model
probabilities pik
• combine estimates of xik to
IMM state estimate xk
• update lχ2 (k) and
lGLR,k(θ) and set
AFA,k = 1, if failures
were detected
Initialization of Pi0,
Qi, Ri, xi0 and p
i
0
Output of state
estimate xk and
integrity measure Ak
Figure 2: Sketch of proposed algorithm for trajectory tracking
and integrity assessment of AIS messages based on an IMM-
EKF framework.
The filter design that was introduced in this Section is
summarized in Fig. 2 depicting the main steps of the algorithm.
For each process model a separate EKF is embedded in an
IMM framework, that mixes the initial conditions for each
prediction-correction step of the individual EKFs. Unless no
new AIS measurement arrives the prediction step is repeated
at a rate of ∆t = 1 s, constantly verifying that the growing un-
certainty of the predicted positions is still within bounds. After
each measurement update the innovation-based test statistics
for the chi-squared and GLR tests are updated for online
failure detection. The output of the filter is the combined
state estimate and the integrity measure, indicating whether
the filtered data can be trusted or not. For the overall filter
initialization the content of the first received AIS message is
used to set the position, COG and SOG within xi0, while the
turn rate ω0 for the CTRV model is initialized to 0
◦
/s.
IV. RESULTS
A. Filter configuration
Prior to the discussion of any result, the configuration of
the described filter shall be listed in the following.
• The IMM incorporates a transition matrix T, that reflects
the tendency of the underlying Markov process to switch
or maintain the current mode. The impact of moderate
changes in different T is known to be rather nominal
to the performance of the IMM. Thus, the transition
probabilities was empirically set to
T =
(
0.8 0.2
0.2 0.8
)
, (48)
while the initial model probabilities pi0 were equally
distributed to 1/D = 0.5.
• The EKF requires for each model the initial definition
of the process and measurement covariances Qi and Ri
as well as its associated error state covariance Pi0. In
contrast to the latter, Qi and Ri are assumed to be
time-invariant. The ratio between these two covariances
is of prime importance to the performance of the EKF,
as it reflects how much trust can be placed into the
measurement or system model. Table II summarizes all
settings for the EKF.
• To detect failures in the observed system, two methods
were proposed, the chi-squared and the GLR hypotheses
test. Both require the setting of only two parameters, that
are Nχ2 and α = 0.05 for the former, and NGLR and
the detection threshold h for the latter. In fact, for each
physical failure model expressed in Γz(t, θ) a different
threshold might be set, since basically ξ GLR tests are
conducted for ξ different failure models. For this work,
only one type of fault is modelled, which is the jump
defined in (41). This is understood as primary source of
failure regarding AIS position data. A method proposed
by [21] was adopted that allows to derive a reasonable
value for hξ in relation to a specific FAR. For that
purpose, a sequence of failure-free measurement data
was used. With a FAR of 10−3 a detection threshold of
Table II: Initial settings of the EKF for both implemented
process models.
CV CTRV
Q
σψ = 0.5
◦ σω = 0.1
◦
/s
σv = 0.07m/s σv = 0.07m/s
R σp,x = σp,y = 5 m
P 0.5× I4×4 0.5× I5×5
hjump = 0.67 was obtained. Both tests are conducted
over a windowed data sample of widths Nχ2 and NGLR.
However, the meaning of both parameters is somewhat
different. While Nχ2 is a tuning parameter directly in-
fluencing the sensitivity of the chi-squared test, NGLR is
also affecting the precision of the GLR failure detection.
In fact, the sensitivity of the GLR method is mostly
steered by the detection threshold hjump, mentioned
earlier. For this work NGLR and Nχ2 were empirically
set to 10 and 3, respectively.
B. Simulated measurements
A first proof of concept was conducted on behalf of
simulated data to validate the principle functioning of the
designed filter. The main focus was laid on the ability of the
proposed schemes to detect failures in severe conditions. For
that purpose, a commercial radar simulator5 was configured to
simulate a test trajectory for an arbitrary outbound container
vessel in the harbour of Hamburg, Germany. This radar
simulator does not only produce realistic radar images, but
also AIS messages, following the ITU-R specification. The
simulated AIS position values, being rather ideally accurate,
were artificially degraded in each component by an AWGN
sequence, following N (0, σAIS = 5m). While this already
yields a challenging scenario, two jumps were additionally
inserted at t1 = 820 s and t2 = 1220 s in the AIS trajectory.
The magnitude of the jumps was set to mj = 5
√
σ2x + σ
2
y =
5
√
2σAIS , where mj =
√
∆p2x + ∆p
2
y . Figure 3 depicts the
simulated vessel trajectory. For verification purposes of the
designed filter, three cases will be studied. The first two
involve a stand-alone EKF conditioned on either the CV or
CTRV process model only, omitting the mixing stages of the
IMM. In the third setting, the full IMM-EKF was executed
with both models running in parallel. From the results shown
in Fig. 4 two main conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, all
three filters show similar performance, with the IMM filter
providing the best result in terms of Root Mean Square Error
(RMSE) and the EKF-CV in terms of maximum 2D position
error. Secondly, comparing the stand-alone performance for
both process models, the CTRV is slightly worse than the
CV for this specific test track. The latter is not surprising,
5ANS6000 by Rheinmetall Defence
Figure 3: Nautical chart showing simulated track in the
harbour of Hamburg, Germany. The inserted position faults,
modelled as jumps, are clearly visible in the trajectory.
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Figure 4: 2D position error of filtered and simulated AIS data,
when compared to reference data (noise and fault-free). The
upper plot depicts the time series of the deviations, whereas
the bottom plot compares the corresponding CDFs.
since the simulated trajectory yields only a few turn ma-
noeuvres in the first place. The principle similarity of both
models is also reflected in Fig. 5 displaying the IMM-EKF
model probabilities for the complete test track. During the
straight path motion segments, the filter tends towards the CV
model, whereas both models are just as likely during the turn
manoeuvres at very low speeds. In Table III two prominent
measures, namely the RMSE and the maximum deviation,
for each distribution of the 2D position errors from Fig. 4
are listed. Another aspect of interest, is the ability of the
filter to detect the artificially inserted system faults, which is
Table III: Statistics for deviation of different filter settings.
AIS
(noisy w/
faults)
IMM-
EKF
EKF-CV EKF-
CTRV
RMSE 6.22 m 5.30 m 5.39 m 5.39 m
max. 32.08 m 23.93 m 19.82 m 25.55 m
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Figure 5: IMM model probabilities for simulated AIS data
(upper plot) compared to the estimated COG (lower plot). The
CV dominates the CTRV model over the entire track.
crucial for signaling an integrity alert. With the chosen settings
the inserted jumps were clearly detected by both methods.
However, as can be seen in Fig. 6, false alarms are issued by
both test methods. For each scheme the test statistic is plotted,
which is essentially compared to a fixed threshold (black,
dashed line) after each measurement update. Whenever the
blue curve is above this threshold an integrity alarm is raised.
In contrast to the chi-squared test, the sensitivity of the GLR
test could easily be adopted by raising the threshold hjump.
This illustrates the drawback of the rather trivial chi-squared
test. For this particular scenario it was not possible to isolate
the two failures, no matter which size of Nχ2 or α was chosen.
It has to be stated, though, that this simulation is considered a
worst-case scenario, which is assumed to be non-representative
for the majority of real-world data. It is claimed in [22] that
the accuracy to be expected from GPS is usually better than
3.5 m, whereas this test track simulates an accuracy of 5 m
at the 68 % confidence interval. Thus, the detection threshold
hjump remained deliberately unmodified, to gain a test reliable
in most real-world scenarios rather than over-fitting the test to
a simulation. In fact, an increased number of false alarms in
troublesome environments is still acceptable, as long as serious
deviations are among the detected faults. In a second, less
severe scenario with σAIS = 3 m almost no false alarms are
issued any more, at the cost of non-detected faults in case of
chi-squared hypothesis testing (see Fig. 7). What can be seen
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Figure 6: Test statistics for the chi-squared and GLR detection
schemes showing clear peaks at the inserted measurement
faults. The noisy position data (σAIS = 5 m) yields also a
number of false alarms in both methods, due to the violated
detection threshold (dashed line).
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Figure 7: Failure detection in a less challenging environment
(σAIS = 3 m) with less severe failures. Both methods issue
almost no false alarms.
in both scenarios is the better precision of the failure detection
in case of the GLR method. Due to the averaging over several
samples of the squared and normalized residual, a failure in
the recent past still reflects into the chi-squared test statistic
at present time k.
C. Real-world measurements
Based on the measurement campaign introduced in Section
II-A, the filter was also validated against real-world AIS data.
As can be seen in Fig. 8, the IMM-EKF filter performs best
in terms of 2D position error. While the stand-alone EKF
conditioned on a CTRV model performs almost in the same
range, the CV model leads to a RMSE nearly three times as
bad. This is most probably due to the sharp turns of the vessel,
Table IV: Statistics for 2D position error in real-world scenario
for different filter settings.
AIS IMM-
EKF
EKF-CV EKF-
CTRV
RMSE 8.10 m 6.90 m 18.03 m 7.44 m
max. 119.90 m 72.99 m 87.29 m 73.09 m
where the estimated COG of the CV model is adopting very
slowly to the actual state of the vessel. Eventually, this leads to
a misfit between measurement data and model for these time
instances. In contrast to the simulation, the measurement data
contains no sequences of very low speed with frequent position
jumps. Indeed, the CTRV model is not falsely estimating the
turn rate, which leads to a much better fit to the data. In Table
IV the RMSE and the maximum of the 2D position error for
the different filter configurations are listed.
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Figure 8: 2D position errors for the IMM-EKF framework, the
stand-alone EKFs (conditioned on either CV or CTRV) and
the original AIS data set. The deviations are compared over
time in the upper and by their CDFs in the lower plot.
Regarding the model probability of the IMM filter in Fig.
9 it can be concluded that the expectations for this track are
met. For visualization purposes the model probabilities are
plotted against the unwrapped COG of the vessel, indicating
each turn manoeuvre of the vessel. The typical behavior of an
IMM filter can be very well observed, as it tends towards one
particular model. In fact, the CV clearly dominates the CTRV
for straight line motion parts. Even during most of the turn
manoeuvres the CV is slightly more probable than the CTRV.
This might be surprising considering the poor performance of
the stand-alone CV model. In an IMM framework, however,
the initial conditions of each prediction-correction cycle are
always reset by mixing the latest state estimate and its covari-
ances of the individual EKFs. During every turn manoeuvre
the initial mixed state estimate for each separate EKF will be
5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5
−10
0
10
time [UTC hours of day]
ψ
[r
ad
]
COG
Change of Course
5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
m
od
el
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
CTRV
CV
Change of Course
Figure 9: IMM-EKF model probabilities for the complete test
track (upper plot), compared to the estimated COG (lower
plot). The switching of probabilities correlates with the turn
manoeuvres of the vessel, which are gray shaded.
strongly affected by the CTRV model, correcting also the COG
conditioned on the CV. This yields an improved performance
of the IMM filter, as it merges the benefits of both models.
Thus, only the filter output can be fairly compared, not the
performance of each model. Additionally to the position error
of the IMM filter, the estimated state parameters COG and
SOG are plotted together with their errors in Fig. 10. The
impact of the AIS position errors are clearly visible in the
SOG estimate, which shows heavy bumps whenever an outlier
in the measurement data occurs. In these cases, the filter tries
to adopt the tracked state to the offset position measurements.
Again, to which extent these outliers affect the state estimate
is tuned via the ratio of the process and measurement noise
covariances. For the chosen settings of the IMM filter, the
RMSE of the estimated COG is 4.78 ◦, whereas the SOG
deviates with a RMSE of 0.27m/s from the reference data. In
contrast to the simulated track, the detected failures from the
chi-squared and the GLR test are almost identical. The overall
integrity alert being constituted from the expression in (47) is
displayed in Fig. 11 for both methods. It can safely be stated
that all faults or position errors above 21 m were identified as
such. Both methods issue false alarms at t ' 9.65 h, which
is due to a strong deviation in the position estimates (see
Fig. 8). Again, the GLR proves to be more precise in failure
localization, than the chi-squared test. On average, a failure
was indicated for roughly 36.7 s in case of chi-squared, but
only for 20 s with GLR testing. However, with this proof of
concept done, for the time being it can be concluded that the
chi-squared method suffices the purpose of failure detection
in AIS position data.
V. CONCLUSION
This work introduces a novel method for integrity moni-
toring of maritime AIS data. An IMM-EKF framework was
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Figure 10: IMM-EKF estimates of state elements COG (upper
two plots) and SOG (lower two plots) over time. Below each
parameter, the error relative to the reference data is shown in
a second plot.
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Figure 11: Final integrity measure for IMM-EKF based either
on chi-squared or GLR fault detection (blue curves in both
plots). Each measure is compared to the 2D position error of
the original AIS data (red, dotted lines).
designed, providing not only filtered and continuous PNT data
of the observed vessel, but also means for integrity assessment
of the transmitted data. The combination of two different
process models in the IMM approach, namely the CV and
CTRV, proved to be beneficial compared to a stand-alone EKF
conditioned on only one of them. For failure detection the
common chi-squared and GLR hypotheses tests were imple-
mented and compared. The test scenarios comprised simulated
and real-world data from a dedicated measurement campaign.
It was affirmed that the CTRV model fits turn manoeuvres of
the vessel best, whereas the CV is superior in straight line
motion. In terms of failure detection, the rather trivial chi-
squared test was not dramatically inferior to the GLR test. All
severe outliers in the AIS positions were detected as such, with
a remarkably low number of false alarms in case of real-world
data. However, the GLR proved to be more precise in isolating
the time of failure. Additionally, if analysis showed other
types of failures to be common in AIS data, the GLR could
easily be extended by these failure models, due to its flexible
framework. In future, comprehensive data analysis shall be
conducted with the implemented filter to gain reliable numbers
on AIS data integrity. Additionally, the designed framework
shall be extended to fuse AIS with radar data to facilitate
collision avoidance in the maritime surveillance domain.
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